

National Leaders, Political Security, and International Military Coalitions

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March 8, 2013

Research Agenda

Question (general). How do international coalitions affect patterns of war and peace?

- Choice of partner affects
 - ▶ Threats, signaling, and war
 - Triangle 2012, r&r at *AJPS*
 - ▶ Conflict expansion
 - *ISQ* 2014, last year at A&M
 - ▶ Survival (or not) after victory
 - in process

Today: domestic sources of coalition building (w/Emily Ritter)

Research Question

Question (specific). When (and with whom) do leaders form military coalitions?

- 40% of wars, 25% of crises
- Longer, bloodier, and more destructive
- Default option for United States

Defining Coalitions

A coalition is

- ≥ 2 states taking same side
- in a specific crisis (thus short term)
- not necessarily (indeed rarely) allies

Building Coalitions

Tradeoff in military cooperation

- Improves military prospects
- Requires that partners be compensated

How do domestic politics affect this tradeoff?

Theoretical model

Structure/assumptions

- National leader (ℓ) and potential partner state (P)
- ℓ in a crisis where failure decreases chances of political survival
- ℓ acts alone or proposes side payment to P
- If P accepts,
 - ▶ Coalition forms
 - ▶ ℓ 's chances of military success improve
 - ▶ Side payments at expense of public interest

Theoretical model

Hypotheses

- H.1 Politically secure leaders are less likely to form coalitions than insecure leaders.
- H.2 Leaders are less likely to form coalition with given partner as foreign policy preferences diverge.
- H.3 Politically secure leaders are more selective in choosing partners than politically insecure leaders.

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Theoretical model

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

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Research Design


- Leader-potential partner crisis-dyads (ICB), 1951-2001
- DV: Coalition of ℓ & P (Wolford 2014)
- IV.1: ℓ 's job security (Young 2008, Chiozza & Goemans 2004)
- IV.2: Dyadic preference divergence (Reed et al. 2008)
- Controls: regime type, contiguity, relative power, energy consumption, population

$$\Pr(\text{Coalition}_{\ell,P}) = \Phi(\alpha + \beta_1 (\text{Security}_{\ell}) + \beta_2 (\text{Divergence}_{\ell,P}) + \beta_3 (\text{Security}_{\ell} \times \text{Divergence}_{\ell,P}) + \beta \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i),$$

Results, Hypotheses 1 & 2



Results, Hypothesis 3




Conclusion

- Coalitions a tradeoff b/w military prospects and compensation
- Tension between private/public incentives
 - ▶ Insecure leaders seek out partners. . .
 - ▶ *but* are less selective in choosing them
- Explains diversity of preferences in coalitions, which affects
 - ▶ Probability of war
 - ▶ Probability of expansion

Conclusion

Questions?

A model of coalition formation



Utility Functions

l 's expected utility for a coalition

$$\alpha(p_{LP} + (1 - p_{LP})\rho(\theta)) + (1 - \alpha)(p_{LPS} - c_{LP})$$

l 's expected utility for unilateral action

$$\alpha(p_L + (1 - p_L)\rho(\theta)) + (1 - \alpha)(p_L - c_L)$$

P 's participation constraint

$$p_{LP}\beta(1 - s) - c_P \geq 0 \Leftrightarrow s \leq \max\left\{1 - \frac{c_P}{p_{LP}\beta}, 0\right\}$$

Empirical Results

Dependent Variable : $\Pr(\text{Coalition}_{\ell,P})$		
Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Job Security $_{\ell}$	-0.310 (-0.479,-0.141)	0.110 (-0.176,0.395)
Divergence $_{\ell,P}$	-0.302 (-0.382,-0.223)	0.0404 (-0.154,0.235)
Job Security $_{\ell} \times$ Divergence $_{\ell,P}$	—	-0.457 (-0.717,-0.197)
N	6642	6642
Log-likelihood	-861.617	-860.668
χ^2	662.013	781.486

95% CIs, two-tailed tests. St errors in parentheses.